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1INTEREST OF AMICI
Amici are law and business school professors at 
schools throughout the United States.1 We have no 
personal interest in the outcome of this case, but a 
professional interest in seeing that patent law develops 
in a way that encourages rather than retards innovation 
and creativity. Institutional affiliations are given for 
identifi cation purposes only.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents two issues that justify this Court’s 
review.
First, the Federal Circuit upheld a fi nding of design 
patent infringement based on the very same Apple designs 
that it found functional under trade dress law. Such a 
counterintuitive outcome is possible because the Federal 
Circuit has constructed a highly constrained defi nition of 
functionality in design patent law, which is at odds with 
this Court’s precedent in both utility patent and trade 
dress cases. Coupled with its recent re-interpretation 
of the design patent infringement standard, the Federal 
Circuit’s approach to functionality makes it quite likely 
that defendants will be held liable for doing nothing more 
than implementing functional features that could not be 
protected with utility patents. This Court should grant 
1.  No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in 
part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No 
person other than the amici, or their counsel, made a monetary 
contribution intended to fund its preparation or submission. The 
parties have consented to the fi ling of this brief.
2review to address the relationship of functionality to 
design patent infringement.
Second, despite Samsung’s own patents, its engineering 
and design work, and the fact that technologies developed 
by Google and countless other inventors are incorporated 
in Samsung’s phones, the Federal Circuit affi rmed the 
jury’s damages award of Samsung’s entire profi t from 
phones that were held to infringe Apple’s design patents. 
Under the Federal Circuit’s reading of 35 U.S.C. §289, 
design patent infringers, unlike infringers of copyrights, 
trademarks, or utility patents on technical inventions, are 
liable for their entire profi ts from an infringing product, 
even if the patented design is only a minor feature of that 
product.
That draconian rule is in conflict with both the 
Second’s and Sixth Circuit’s statutory interpretations, 
dates back more than a century to circumstances that no 
longer apply today, and is inconsistent with this Court’s 
rule for utility patent damages. As applied to a modern, 
multicomponent product, the entire profi t rule drastically 
overcompensates design patent owners, undervalues 
technological innovation and manufacturing know-how, 
and raises troubling questions about how to handle other 
potential claims to a share of the defendant’s profi ts. The 
rule applies even to innocent design patent infringement, 
which recent Federal Circuit infringement precedent has 
rendered more likely.
This Court should grant certiorari to review the 
meaning of section 289, an issue it has never addressed. 
Section 289 should be read, in accordance with wise 
policy and the remainder of the patent statute, to limit 
3the award of profi ts to those attributable to infringement 
of the design patent.
ARGUMENT
II. The Federal Circuit’s Functionality Doctrine 
Gives Unwarranted Scope to Design Patents and 
Undermines the Promotion of Technological 
Progress
A. The Federal  Circuit’s  Desig n Patent 
Functionality Doctrine Is Inconsistent with 
this Court’s Constitutionally-Grounded 
Approach to Trade Dress Functionality
The basic rule of design patent infringement has 
been the same since Gorham Co. v. White, which held 
that a design patent is infringed “if, in the eye of an 
ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser 
usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if 
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, 
inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other.” 
81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871). Crucially, design patents protect 
only ornamentation. They may not cover the functional 
aspects of a product. 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (“a design patent 
may only be granted for a “new, original, and ornamental 
design”).
Functionality doctrine channels protection for a 
product’s visual ornamentation and shape toward design 
patent protection, while claims to useful solutions are 
directed to utility patents. The doctrine prevents parties 
from obtaining a patent on the functional aspects of 
inventions that are obvious, a limitation this Court has 
held is constitutionally required. Graham v. John Deere 
4Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966); KSR Int’l Co. v. Telefl ex, Inc., 
550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007). Utility patent doctrine aims 
to balance protections needed to induce invention with 
follow-on inventors’ need to build on prior technologies 
and to ensure access to technologies in the public domain. 
In the trade dress context, this Court has recognized 
that overreaching protection can undermine this balance 
and must be reined in by the functionality doctrine. See 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 
U.S. 23, 29-30, 34 (2001) (“The Lanham Act does not exist 
to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating 
a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law 
and its period of exclusivity.”)
The Federal Circuit has eviscerated the functionality 
doctrine in design patent law, narrowing it almost to 
the point of nonexistence. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna & 
Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in 
Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Michael Risch, 
Functionality and Graphical User Interface Design 
Patents, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 53 (2014). Under the 
Federal Circuit’s reading, a design is functional—and thus 
unprotectable—only if there is no other possible way to 
achieve the same technological utility. Avia Group Int’l, 
Inc. v. L.A. Gear of Cal., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 
1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (design is functional only if it 
is “the only possible form of the article that could perform 
its function.”). Needless to say, that almost never happens. 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has found a claimed design 
functional in only two published opinions, both issued 
before 1996.2
2.  Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566-57 
(Fed Cir. 1996); Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 
F.2d 234 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Federal Circuit remanded on the 
5The Federal Circuit’s “only possible form” standard 
for design patent functionality is much narrower than 
this Court’s functionality standard for trade dress, under 
which a feature is functional not only if it “is essential 
to the use or purpose of the article” being sold, but also 
if “it affects the cost or quality of the article.” TrafFix, 
532 U.S. at 35. The inconsistency between the doctrines 
is evident in this very case. The Federal Circuit held 
Apple’s trade dress invalid as functional, but it affi rmed 
liability for infringement of design patents on the very 
same features. There is no justifi cation in statutory text, 
history, or policy for interpreting functionality differently 
for design patents than for trade dress. This Court should 
harmonize the design patent functionality doctrine with 
its functionality precedents in trade dress law.
B. The Federal Circuit’s Infringement Approach 
Permits Design Patent Owners Exclusivity 
over Functional Aspects of Designs
Recent developments in design patent infringement 
doctrine exacerbate the dangers in the Federal Circuit’s 
meager view of functionality, making it even more likely that 
design patents will give their owners unwarranted control 
over utilitarian features. Design patent infringement 
is determined by asking “whether an ordinary observer, 
familiar with the prior art, would be deceived into thinking 
that the accused design was the same as the patented design.” 
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 
672 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). Before 2008, courts applied 
issue in two other cases. PHG Technologies, LLC v. St. John 
Companies, Inc., 469 F.3d 1361 (2006); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. 
Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
6a “point of novelty” approach to the comparison, fi nding 
infringement only if the accused design incorporated novel 
and nonobvious aspects of the patentee’s claimed design. Id. 
at 670-71.3 The Federal Circuit rejected that approach, 
holding that the ordinary observer test is the “sole test” 
for determining infringement, id. at 678,4 even when 
“the patented design incorporates numerous functional 
elements.” Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 
1288, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Many design patents cover designs that include 
clearly functional features, and many cover designs 
whose ornamentality in any ordinary sense of the term 
is questionable at best. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. 
McKenna, Scope, __ Wm. & Mary L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 
2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2660951. But 
under current Federal Circuit law, the jury is no longer 
required to exclude those functional elements from 
consideration when it decides infringement. Under the 
Federal Circuit’s unguided ordinary observer test, it is 
all too possible that a design patent owner will be able to 
prevent competitors from copying utilitarian features that 
are unprotectable under utility patent law.
3.  See also Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1188 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (“it is the non-functional, design aspects that are 
pertinent to determinations of infringement”). 
4.  The Federal Circuit has also concluded that points of novelty 
no longer are relevant to design patent validity. See, e.g., Int’l Seaway 
Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1237–38 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009); Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
1253 (2011). 
7The Federal Circuit’s analysis in Richardson 
suggested that the problems caused by the Egyptian 
Goddess infringement test might be mitigated by 
construing design patent claims in light of “the distinction 
between the functional and ornamental aspects of a 
design.” 597 F.3d at 1293. The district court in that case, 
after identifying the ornamental aspects of the patented 
tool design, had deemed the accused design noninfringing 
because its only similarities to the claimed design related 
to unprotectable functional elements. Id. at 1295. The 
Federal Circuit affi rmed, “agree[ing] that, ignoring the 
functional elements of the tools, the two designs are indeed 
different.” Id. at 1296.
Subsequent developments have l imited the 
effectiveness of the Richardson approach, however. The 
Federal Circuit has not required district courts to apply 
Richardson and fi lter out the unprotectable elements 
of a design. Moreover, district courts have had trouble 
applying Richardson in the common circumstance in 
which claim construction and functionality are handled 
separately. See, e.g., Weber-Stephen Prods. LLC v. Sears 
Holding Corp., 2014 WL 5333364 (N.D. Ill. October 20, 
2014) (“unlike the typical case, the Richardson trial court 
was able to consider claim construction and functionality 
together, with the benefi t of a fully developed record at 
trial”).
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in the present case 
weakens Richardson still further by ruling that the 
ordinary observer should not ignore utilitarian aspects 
of the products in comparing the designs and that claims 
should not be construed to eliminate elements that are 
structural or “dictated by their functional purpose.” 786 
8F.3d at 998. The court also deemed it unnecessary to 
instruct jury members to compare only the ornamental 
appearance of the accused product with the claimed 
design, as long as the instructions “as a whole” informed 
them that the patents claimed “the ornamental design” of 
the devices – a black-letter defi nition of a design patent. 
Id. at 999.
The facts of this case illustrate the importance of these 
doctrinal developments. Apple’s patented design for the iPhone 
is shown at the left of the fi gure above. One of Samsung’s 
accused phones is shown at the right. The trade dress analysis 
in the opinion recognizes that many features of Apple’s design, 
such as rounded corners, a fl at clear screen, and a bezel, are 
functional. Moreover, Apple was not the fi rst to come up with 
a mobile computer with similar features.
An infringement analysis that excluded from the 
comparison design elements that were functional or in the 
prior art would recognize the narrowness of the patentable 
aspects of Apple’s design and ask whether Samsung’s products 
appropriated those aspects of the design that make it patentable. 
9By moving away from that approach and emphasizing the 
ordinary observer’s comparison of the overall designs, the 
Federal Circuit creates a signifi cant risk that a patentee will 
prevail even if an observer would fi nd the two designs similar 
only because they share features that are functional or in the 
prior art.
This Court has made clear that the functionality doctrine 
exists to protect the public’s right to make use of functional 
characteristics that are unpatentable or no longer protected 
by a utility patent. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29-30. Giving a 
design patent owner control over utilitarian features 
undermines the policy goals of the functionality doctrine. 
But that is precisely what results from the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of design patent functionality and infringement 
law. This Court should grant review in order to align design 
patent law with the important policy goals of the functionality 
doctrine and render it consistent with the long-standing rules 
of utility patent and trade dress law.
II. The Federal Circuit’s Decision Limit Profits 
to Those Attributable to the Patented Design 
Produces Absurd Results
A. The Origin and Context of Section 289
Patent law has long included a damages apportionment 
principle. While early patents tended to be on fairly simple 
machines or chemical inventions, the industrial revolution 
brought patents on small parts of large, multicomponent 
inventions, such as locomotives. When courts awarded 
damages or defendant’s profi ts for infringement of such 
patents, they awarded damages attributable to the 
patent rather than to the defendant’s product as a whole. 
10
In Garretson v. Clark, for example, this Court said the 
patentee “must in every case give evidence tending to 
separate or apportion the defendant’s profi ts and the 
patentee’s damages between the patented feature and the 
unpatented features . . . .” 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884).
In the nineteenth century, design patents were 
treated no differently. In the Dobson cases, involving 
carpets, this Court found that, while the design patents at 
issue had been infringed, there was no evidence by which 
a factfi nder could distinguish the value of the patented 
design from the value of the unpatented carpet itself. 
As a result, the Court ultimately awarded only nominal 
damages of $0.06. Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 18 
(1886); Dobson v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439 (1885); 
Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439 (1885). That 
result incensed many.
In 1887, when Congress rewrote the Patent Act, it 
responded to these concerns by passing a new provision 
addressing design patent infringement. That provision 
set a fl oor of $250 for design patent damages and made 
a defendant “further liable for the excess of such profi t 
over and above” $250. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 105, § 1, 24 
Stat. 387, 387. The 1887 Act made defendants liable only 
for knowing acts of design patent infringement, mitigating 
any potential unfairness of the Act’s damages rule. As 
Representative Butterworth put it, “no man will suffer 
either penalty or damage unless he willfully appropriates 
the property of another.” 18 CONG. REC. 836 (1887). The 
House Report similarly assured that “an innocent dealer 
or user is not affected.” H.R. REP. NO. 49-1966, at 4.
11
B. Awarding a Defendant’s Entire Profi ts Makes 
No Sense in the Modern World
The design patent damages provision remains, 
albeit in substantially modified form, in what is now 
section 289 of the Patent Act. Nowadays, however, design 
patent infringement, like utility patent infringement, is 
a strict liability claim, no longer requiring the knowing 
appropriation emphasized by Congress when passing the 
1887 Act.
Congress’s 1887 assumption that “it is the design 
that sells the article”5 may still be true of carpets, but it 
surely is not true of all products covered by design patents 
today. The likelihood that a product incorporates more 
than one patented design is much greater than it was in 
1887. Design patents on virtual features, such as icons, 
are particularly likely to overlap, and there are more and 
more of them. Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Virtual 
Designs, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 107 (2013) (documenting 
the growth of virtual design patents). If there is more 
than one patented design in a product, the assumption 
that any particular patented design drives the sale of the 
product falls apart.
That is what has happened in this case. Here is one of 
Apple’s many design patents on its iPhone.6
5.   H.R. REP. NO. 49-1966, at 3 (1886), reprinted in 18 CONG. 
REC. 834 (1887).
6.   U.S. Patent No. D618,677. fi g.1 (fi led Nov. 18, 2008).
12
Here is another Apple iPhone design patent.7
It is (barely) possible to argue with a straight face that 
it is the shape and overall ornamental design of the iPhone, 
rather than its functionality, that motivates consumers to 
buy it. It is not even remotely plausible that the shape of 
the Apple iTunes icon is what motivates people to buy the 
whole iPhone. And it literally cannot be the case that the 
phone shape patent and the iTunes icon patent are each 
7.  U.S. Patent No. D668,263. fi g.1 (fi led Oct. 8, 2010).
13
the sole driver of a consumer buying the phone. Notably, 
all of the patents Apple asserted in this litigation cover 
discrete parts, rather than the entire phone. And while 
these patents on different aspects of the iPhone’s design 
happen to be owned by the same company, there is no 
reason to think that the same will always be the case for 
similarly complex products.
Nor does all, or even most, of the value of a product 
come from patented designs. People do not buy iPhones for 
their appearance alone; they buy them for their functions. 
Those functions contribute substantially to the phone’s 
value and they are covered by many utility patents. 
Indeed, by one estimate, there are 250,000 patents that 
arguably cover various aspects of a smartphone.8 To 
conclude that one design patent drives the purchase of the 
product, and therefore that the defendant’s entire profi t is 
attributable to infringing that patent, is to say that none 
of those functional features contribute anything to the 
value of the phone – a ludicrous proposition.
Indeed, for most products (excluding, say, fashion) it 
is more plausible that a functional feature covered by a 
utility patent drives demand than that a patented design 
feature does. Yet even utility patent owners rarely are 
awarded damages based on the entire value of the product. 
In the rare case where that does happen, the utility 
patent owner must have proved that the patent was the 
basis for market demand. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation of section 289 requires no such 
8.  See David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android, 
GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Aug. 3, 2011), http://googleblog.blogspot.
com/2011/08/when-patents-attack-android.html.
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proof. It simply assumes that the only valuable thing about 
a product is its design. That assumption is not plausible 
in the modern world. See Mark A. Lemley, A Rational 
System of Design Patent Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 219, 233 (2013).
Further, awarding the defendant’s entire profi t based 
on a plaintiff’s small contribution to a product’s value 
would cause signifi cant mischief, as this Court noted in 
Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480 (1853):
If the measure of damages be the same 
whether a patent be for an entire machine or 
for some improvement in some part of it, then 
it follows that each one who has patented an 
improvement in any portion of a steam engine or 
other complex machines may recover the whole 
profi ts arising from the skill, labor, material, 
and capital employed in making the whole 
machine, and the unfortunate mechanic may be 
compelled to pay treble his whole profi ts to each 
of a dozen or more several inventors of some 
small improvement in the engine he has built. 
By this doctrine even the smallest part is made 
equal to the whole, and ‘actual damages’ to the 
plaintiff may be converted into an unlimited 
series of penalties on the defendant.
We think, therefore, that it is a very grave error 
to instruct a jury ‘that as to the measure of 
damages the same rule is to govern, whether 
the patent covers an entire machine or an 
improvement on a machine.’
Id. at 490-91.
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C. Section 289 Does Not Require Disgorgement 
of Profi ts Unrelated to the Patented Design
The proper interpretation of section 289 should 
consider the provision as a whole. Section 289 currently 
reads in its entirety:
Whoever during the term of a patent for a 
design, without license of the owner, (1) applies 
t he patented design, or any colorable imitation 
thereof, to any article of manufacture for the 
purpose of sale, or (2) sells or  exposes for sale 
any article of manufacture to which such design 
or colorable imitation has been applied shall be 
liable to the owner to the extent of his total 
profi t, but not less than $250, recoverable in any 
United States district court having jurisdiction 
of the parties.
Nothing in this section shall prevent, lessen, or 
impeach any other remedy which an owner of 
an infringed patent has under the provisions 
of this title, but he shall not twice recover the 
profi t made from the infringement.
35 U.S.C. §289 (emphasis added).
Section 289 does say that a defendant is “liable to the 
owner to the extent of his total profi t.” Read literally, that 
general language might permit damages beyond profi ts 
from the sale of the infringing product. Nonetheless, basic 
principles of remedies law require a plaintiff to show some 
connection between the damages and the infringement. 
As the Seventh Circuit put it in the copyright context, a 
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plaintiff must do more than simply attach the defendant’s 
income tax return to the complaint and say it wants all 
the money that defendant made from whatever source.9
That basic principle has been applied in design patent 
cases as well. Indeed, in one early design patent case, in 
which the defendant sold refrigerators with door latches 
that infringed the plaintiff’s patent, the court refused 
to award the entire profi ts from refrigerators, instead 
defaulting to the $250 statutory minimum because the 
latch was not sold separately. Young v. Grand Rapids 
Refrigerator Co., 268 F. 966, 973-74 (6th Cir. 1920). The 
court required a connection between the design patent 
and the profi ts awarded, and held that the owner of a 
patent on a latch was not entitled to the entire profi t 
on the refrigerator. Similarly, the court in Bush & 
Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros., 222 F. 902 (2d Cir. 1915) 
opined:
The question which seems to have received little 
attention upon the accounting, due probably to 
the form of the decree, is whether the profi ts 
made by the defendant should be the entire 
profi ts of the sales of the piano and case or 
the profits upon the sale of the case which 
alone is the sole subject of the patent. We are 
of the opinion that the latter rule should have 
controlled the accounting.
9. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983) (“If 
General Motors were to steal your copyright and put it in a sales 
brochure, you could not just put a copy of General Motors’ corporate 
income tax return in the record and rest your case for an award of 
infringer’s profi ts.”).
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Id. at 903; see also Lemley, supra, at 235; Frederic H. 
Betts, Some Questions Under the Design Patent Act of 
1887, 1 YALE L.J. 181 (1892).
The fi nal paragraph of section 289, prohibiting double 
counting of the defendant’s profi ts and the plaintiff’s 
losses, also supports awarding only the profi ts attributable 
to the patented design. In defi ning “double counting,” 
the statute refers to the defendant’s profi ts measure as 
“the profi t made from the infringement.” 35 U.S.C. §289. 
That language clearly contemplates a focus on the profi ts 
attributable to the patented design: the profi t at issue in 
a design patent case is not the defendant’s total profi t, or 
even defendant’s total profi t from a single product, but the 
profi t “made from”—that is, causally derived from—”the 
infringement.”
Further evidence in support of that interpretation 
comes from another change to the statutory language. The 
1952 Patent Act deleted language from the original statute 
awarding profi ts “made by him from the manufacture or 
sale, as aforesaid, of the article or articles to which the 
design, or colorable imitation thereof, has been applied.” 
That original language suggested that the profi t to be 
awarded was that associated with the articles as a whole, 
rather than only that profi t attributable to the patented 
design. The deletion of that language, coupled with the 
reference in the second paragraph to “profi ts made from 
the infringement,” suggests an interpretation of section 
289 that awards only those profi ts attributable to the 
patented design.
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IV. Conclusion
This Court should grant certiorari to restore 
functionality to its proper role in validity and infringement 
inquiries and to reverse the Federal Circuit’s interpretation 
of section 289.
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